Utah v. Richard Rodriguez : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Utah v. Richard Rodriguez : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Vincent Meister;
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Mark R. Moffat; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rodriguez, No. 940700 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6317
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEA££Kc-f NO. 
KFP BR,EF 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 940700-CA 
v. 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR (COUNT I), 
AND UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR (COUNT II), 
BOTH IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (A) (I) (SUPP. 1994), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANNE M. 
STIRBA, PRESIDING. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
JOAN C.WATT 
MARK R.MOFFAT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
VINCENT MEISTER 
Deputy Salt Lake County Att'y 
2001 South State St., #S-3500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Request for Oral Argument 
and Full Published Opinion 
LED 
12 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 940700-CA 
V. 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR (COUNT I), 
AND UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR (COUNT II), 
BOTH IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (A) (I) (SUPP. 1994), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANNE M. 
STIRBA, PRESIDING. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
JOAN C.WATT 
MARK R.MOFFAT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
VINCENT MEISTER 
Deputy Salt Lake County Att'y 
2001 South State St., #S-3500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Request for Oral Argument 
and Full Published Opinion 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . . . . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 





THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO JUSTIFY DETAINING DEFENDANT TO 
INVESTIGATE AN APPARENT, IMMINENT 
DRUG TRANSACTION 8 
The Standard for Proving Reasonable 
Suspicion is Considerably Less Than a 
Preponderance of the Evidence 9 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded 
That the Facts Supported the Officer's 
Reasonable Suspicion 16 
POINT II DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY GAVE CONSENT 
TO SEARCH EVEN BEFORE THE OFFICER 
REQUESTED IT; THEREFORE, THE ATTENUATION 
TEST UNDER STATE V. THURMAN. DOES 
NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE; EVEN APPLYING 
THE THURMAN TEST, THE OFFICER'S 
CONDUCT WAS NOT SO FLAGRANT THAT 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED .24 
i 
A. The Validity Of Defendant's Consent 
Under The Voluntariness Prong of 
Thurman, 25 
B. Because Consent Was Not Requested 
There is No Issue of Exploitation 27 
C. Arroyo's Attenuation/Exploitation 
Prong As Clarified In Thurman 29 
D. Officer Dailey's Conduct Was Not 
Negligent Under the Circumstances 33 
CONCLUSION 35 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 35 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Preliminary hearing transcript 
Addendum B - Suppression hearing transcript 
(Trial court's ruling) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL 
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975) 25, 30, 31 
Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 49 (1979) 20 
Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 31 
Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) 13 
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) . . . . 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22 
United States v. McCov. 839 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Or. 1993) . . 28 
United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675(1985) 34 
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1 (1989) passim 
STATE CASES 
Com, v. Albino. 652 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. 1995) 23 
People v. Shaw. 596 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) . . . 23 
Sims v. Collection Div of the State Tax Commn. 841 P.2d 
10 (Utah 1992 ) 27 
State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 300 (Utah 1992 ) 27 
Provo Citv v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 14 
State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 25, 27, 28 
State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) 8, 9, 22 
State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) 31 
State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992) 19 
State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) 11, 12 
State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988) 33 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) 26 
• • • 
111 
State v. Chapman. 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992), 
rev'd on other grounds. 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995) . 14 
State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994) 4 
State v. Doleman. 1995 WL 339184 (Del. Super.) 21 
State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah App. 1991) 29 
State v. Ellington. 495 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1993) 20 
State v. Gipson. 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) 19, 20 
State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) 18 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App.1990) 12, 15, 22, 23, 34 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 1 
State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992) 26 
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371 (Utah App. 1992) 10 
State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992) . . . 13, 19 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) passim 
State v. Tru-iillo. 739, P.2d 88 (Utah App. 1987 ) 15 
Thornton v. State. 559 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 20 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1994) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp. 1994) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1995) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Search. Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment. 112 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 378 (1964) 30 
Search & Seizure § 11.4 30 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940700-CA 
v. : 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for attempted unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor 
(Count I), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor (Count II), both in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1994), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was there reasonable suspicion of an imminent drug 
transaction to justify defendant's detention? A trial court's 
determination of whether an investigative stop was supported by-
reasonable suspicion is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. State V. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). The 
trial court's ruling should not, however, be subjected to "a 
close de novo review," Id. Rather, some deference is accorded 
the trial court because the reasonable suspicion standard itself 
uconveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge[s]" so that 
they can "grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may 
constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination.'' Jii. at 939-40. 
In contrast, the trial court's findings of purely factual issues 
that underlie its reasonable suspicion determination, such as 
witness credibility and historical facts, are subject to reversal 
only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 939 n.4. 
2. Is defendant's voluntary consent to search subject to an 
exploitation analysis under State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 
1993), when the court found both (1) that there was no prior 
illegality, i.e., there was reasonable suspicion to detain, and 
(2) defendant consented to a search even before the officer asked 
for his consent? These are conclusions of law that are reviewed 
for correctness. Id. at 1272-73. Assuming, arguendo, the 
applicability of the Thurman exploitation analysis, was 
defendant's consent valid where the officer's conduct was not 
even negligent? The trial court's ultimate conclusions on 
voluntariness and attenuation are reviewed for correctness, while 
the trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set 
2 
aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants.shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1994) 
Section 77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful possession 
of controlled substances, class A and B misdemeanors (Counts I 
and II, respectively), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994) (R. 07-08). Prior to trial defendant 
filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied 
3 
(R. 16). Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Counts I and 
II, respectively (R. 18), reserving the right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 20). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to a term of twelve months in the Salt 
Lake County Jail on Count I, to be served concurrently with a six 
month term on Count II (R. 31-32). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
The facts adduced at the suppression hearing are 
recited below in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling. £g£ State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994) 
(When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 
appellate courts recite the facts in the light most favorable to 
that ruling.). 
At 6:53 p.m., on July 27, 1994, Salt Lake City Police 
Officer Kenneth Dailey was patrolling on his motorcycle along 
Second South, near Pioneer Park, an area well-known for drug 
trafficking (R. 114-15, 121). As he turned north onto Fifth West 
1
 The parties stipulated to submitting to the trial court 
the facts of the case based on the preliminary hearing, a 
transcript of which is attached in its entirety as Addendum A. 
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he saw defendant and another man on the west side of the street 
in the middle of the block (R. 115, 122). Defendant was 
straddling his bicycle and moving toward the other man (R. 115, 
125). The other man was a white male in this thirties, who was 
dressed in new clothes, i.e., tennis shorts, golf shirt and 
tennis shoes, and seemed out of place in that area (R. 118, 126). 
As they approached each other closely, they appeared to talk to 
each other and make eye contact (R. 115, 123, 129). At this 
point the other man took a wad of money from his pocket (R. 115-
16, 123) . 
As Officer Dailey closed to within twenty-five feet of the 
men, the other man put the money back into his pocket, and the 
two started to separate from each other and walk away from the 
officer (R. 116, 124-25). Officer Dailey acknowledged that 
defendant had not then violated the law or taken money from the 
other man (R. 124), but he suspected that the two were involved 
in a drug transaction (R. 116). He asked the two men to stop, 
explained his suspicions to them, and asked them to wait until 
another officer arrived (R. 116, 125). In response, both men 
said that the officer could search them (R. 116). 
At this point Officer Wolrich arrived (R. 116-17). The 
officers searched defendant and found a bag of marijuana in his 
5 
shoe (R. 117). In the interim they also discovered that 
defendant had outstanding warrants against him (R. 117). 
Defendant was then arrested for both a controlled substance 
violation and the outstanding warrants (R. 118). When Officer 
Wolrich turned the bicycle over to check to see if it was stolen, 
a piece of paper containing a white powder fell from a bag tied 
to the handlebars (R. 118, 128) . The powder field tested 
positively for cocaine (R. 119).2 The other man was released, 
but admitted in informal conversation with Officer Dailey that he 
was in the area to buy cocaine (R. 127). 
SUMMARY OF ARSTOSNT 
POINT I 
Both this Court and United States Supreme Courts have stated 
that a finding of reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an 
investigative detention is a determination based on a common-
sense conclusion about human behavior, and that the Fourth 
Amendment requires only a showing based on objective facts that 
suggest that crime may be afoot, which is not defeated because a 
defendant's conduct is arguably innocent. Applying these 
2
 The parties stipulated to the toxicology report, which 
showed that the cocaine weighed 1.8 grams and the marijuana, 4.0 
grams (R. 134). 
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standards, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's 
approach, in an area known for drug trafficking, to another 
individual who tendered money which was then stashed away, 
followed by defendant's attempt to avoid contact with law 
enforcement, gave rise to an experienced police officer's 
reasonable suspicion of a drug transaction justifying an 
investigative stop. 
The crucial fact, in connection with the other 
circumstances, is the tender of a uwad of money," and act 
peculiarly indicative of a drug transaction in an area known for 
drug trafficking. The trial court's conclusion, especially given 
the somewhat deferential standard of review applied to 
determinations of reasonable suspicion, was proper on the facts 
of this case. 
POINT II 
Since the trial court properly ruled that the police officer 
had reasonable suspicion to justify his detaining defendant, 
there exists no prior illegality justifying the application of 
the Thurman exploitation/attenuation test to determine the 
validity of defendant's consent to search. Further, defendant 
voluntarily gave his consent to search without the police 
officer's having asked for it, a fact not disputed on appeal. 
7 
Thus, the giving of consent cannot be the result of exploitation. 
For both of these reasons the exploitation/attenuation test 
should not even be applied in this case. 
Even applying the exploitation/attenuation test# defendant's 
consent is valid. Under Thurman. the test is only appropriately 
applied where official conduct is at least negligent. Given the 
split-second decision-making required of the police officer in 
the rapidly unfolding circumstances of this case, the police 
officer was not negligent in detaining defendant. 
MOTMBNT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY 
DETAINING DEFENDANT TO INVESTIGATE AN 
APPARENT, IMMINENT DRUG TRANSACTION 
The trial court properly determined that detaining defendant 
was lawful because the police officer reasonably suspected that 
defendant was then involved, or had just completed, an illegal 
drug transaction (R. 79) .3 As discussed below, the facts 
3
 In finding reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, the 
trial court also rejected the prosecution argument that Officer 
Dailey's encounter with defendant was a level I encounter (R. 79-
80), see State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) ("A 
level one stop xis a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any 
time.'11) (citation omitted). The trial court noted that in 
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observed by the officer, in light of his experience as a police 
officer having worked undercover narcotics, satisfy the minimal 
objective justification standard for establishing reasonable 
suspicion. This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion. 
A. The Standard for Proving Reasonable Suspicion is 
Considerably Less Than a Preponderance of the 
Evidence. 
The reasonable suspicion test for making an investigative 
stop is well-known: "where an officer observes unusual conduct 
which reasonably leads him to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot" a brief investigative stop 
and detention to dispel the officerfs suspicion or prevent 
criminal activity is justified. Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 22, 
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 1884-85 (1968) (emphasis added); Bean, 
869 P.2d at 986 ("an officer may sslz& a person if the officer 
has an "articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime") (emphasis in original).4 As the 
informing defendant that he believed a drug transaction was going 
on the officer also told defendant and the other man that they 
were to wait until the officer's backup arrived (R. 78-80) . On 
appeal, the State does not dispute this ruling. 
4
 The reasonable suspicion standard is also4codified: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
9 
term "may" in Terry implies, an officerfs on-the-spot 
determination of whether there is reasonable suspicion to support 
an investigative stop requires a weighing of probabilities: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same -- and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 
(1989) (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 418 
(1981)); State v. Smith. 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992) ("In 
developing a reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement 
officers are entitled to reach 'common-sense conclusions about 
human behavior, ' ff citing United States V, SPKQIPW/ 490 U.S. 1, 
109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). 
That is not to say that officers have unbridled discretion 
to stop and detain citizens without being able to articulate some 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp. 1994). 
10 
basis for doing so: 
The officer, of course, must be able to 
articulate something more than an inchoate 
and unparticularlized suspicion or hunch. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
It is clear, however, that the standard for establishing 
reasonable suspicion is a low threshold of proof: 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
Objective justification" for making the stop. 
That level of suspicion is considerably less 
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence. We have held that probable 
cause means "a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found," and the level of suspicion required 
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than probable cause . . . . 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and some 
internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Accord 
Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. 
Shortly after Sokolow was decided, the Utah Supreme Court 
similarly recognized that the standard of proof needed to 
establish reasonable suspicion was less than that needed for 
probable cause. In State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the 
defendant, suspected of robbery, was stopped and questioned by an 
officer. Significantly, the defendant argued that his initial 
11 
detention was unsupported by probable cause. l£. at 650. The 
Supreme Court, however, relying upon Terry and its own post-Terry 
case law, upheld the stop on the less strict, reasonable 
suspicion standard: "We have held that a brief investigatory 
stop of an individual by police officers is permissible when the 
officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, 
that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Bruce. 
779 P.2d at 650 (quoting authorities; internal quotations 
omitted). 
In the wake of Sokolow and Bruce. this Court also recognized 
that reasonable suspicion requires only a minimal level of 
certainty by stating, in State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 
App. 1990), that reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective 
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity" (emphasis added). Bruce and Menke comport with the 
fourth amendments "minimal objective justification" standard for 
establishing reasonable suspicion, set forth in Sokolow. 
The Sokolow standard for establishing reasonable suspicion 
recognizes that limited, non-arrest detentions serve not merely 
to apprehend criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent 
criminal activity. E.g.. Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 
1880 (limited detentions supported by interest in "effective 
12 
crime prevention and detection")• That definition contemplates 
the very real likelihood that many such detentions will reveal no 
criminal evidence. That likelihood, however, does not erode the 
validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment in question, 
would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. 
Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. 
In evaluating the validity of an investigative stop or 
detention, a court must consider "'the totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture.1" Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8, 
109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 
417 (198D). £££ al££ State v, Strickling, 844 p.2d 979, 983 
(Utah App. 1992). Accordingly, "dissecting the facts that 
confronted [the officer]" and [l]ooking at each fact in isolation 
. . . is not proper." Strickling, 844 P.2d at 983. 
There may also have been wholly innocent explanations and 
alternative inferences to be drawn from every one of the factors 
confronting the officer. That, however, has never been a proper 
basis for ruling that an investigative detention was invalid: 
We said in Reifl V, gePrgiS/ 448 U.S. 438, 100 
S. Ct. 2752, [] (1980) (per curiam), "there 
could, of course, be circumstances in which 
wholly lawful conduct might justify the 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." 
. . . Indeed, Terry IV. Ohio! itself involved 
"a series of acts, each of them perhaps 
13 
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which 
taken together warranted further 
investigation," 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct., 
at 1881. 
SPKPIQW, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. 
Utah courts also have recognized that potentially innocent 
behavior may nonetheless give rise to reasonable suspicion. In 
State Vt Chapman/ 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992), rev'd on 
other grounds. 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995), the defendant 
argued that 'all of the factors justifying reasonable suspicion 
listed by the [officer] [we]re consistent with innocent behavior 
and thus, [could not] amount to reasonable suspicion." This 
Court rejected that argument and held that ,f[t]he trial court fs 
findings of fact show that a reasonable person would conclude 
that Chapman had violated the [law]." Id. at 728 (footnote 
omitted). 
Similarly, in Menke. this Court correctly held that the 
behavior of an individual outside a shopping mall, "although 
conceivably consistent with innocent--albeit highly eccentric--
activity," was, nevertheless, also consistent with shoplifting. 
787 P.2d at 541. Therefore, the detention of that individual by 
the observing officers was deemed reasonable. Id. This Court 
reiterated its adherence to M£HlS£ in Provo City v. Spotts. 861 
14 
P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993). Further, this Court has recognized 
that 
[t]he trained law enforcement officer is in a 
different position than the average citizen in 
that he or she "may be able to perceive and 
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be 
wholly innocent to the untrained observer.... The 
officer is entitled to assess the facts in light 
of his experience." TState v.1 Truiillo. 739 P.2d 
[85], 88-89 [(Utah App. 1987)]. 
Menke. 787 P.2d at 541. 
In Spotts. as in Chapman, the defendant argued that "prior 
to the stop, [the officer] observed no activity inconsistent with 
innocent behavior" and that the officer therefore lacked 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 32. The 
Spotts court easily rejected that claim and reviewed all of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop before 
concluding that "although defendant's activity was conceivably 
consistent with innocent behavior, it was strongly indicative of 
criminal activity[.]" Id. at 33. The court therefore upheld the 
trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. 
In this case, while defendant's conduct was conceivably 
innocent, the evidence supports the trial court's findings and 
conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying 
defendant's detention. 
15 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded 
That the Facts Supported the Officer's 
Reasonable Suspicion. 
The facts surrounding Officer Dailey's detaining defendant 
are not disputed and support the trial court's findings and 
conclusions: Officer Dailey, a Salt Lake City policeman with 
eight years experience, including one year with undercover 
narcotics in Las Vegas, saw defendant approaching another man in 
an area well-known for its high incidence of drug trafficking (R. 
114-15). The other man, wearing sports clothing, looked out of 
place (R. 118, 126). He and defendant appeared to be talking to 
each other as they approached each other, at which point the 
other man pulled a wad of money from his pocket (R. 116). 
Defendant did not reach for the money; however, as Officer Dailey 
approached them, the other man put the money back in his pocket, 
and he and defendant began to separate from one another and walk 
away from the police officer, at which point Officer Dailey 
interceded (R. 116, 124-25). 
Upon these facts, the trial court made the following 
findings in concluding that Officer Dailey had reasonable 
suspicion justifying his detaining defendant: (1) Officer Dailey 
was an experienced police officer with a year in narcotics 
enforcement; (2) Officer Dailey came upon defendant and the other 
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man in a high drug trafficking area; (3) defendant was moving 
toward the other man while straddling his bicycle; (4) the other 
man was dressed in something like a tennis outfit; (5) defendant 
and the other man spoke briefly with each other; (6) the other 
man took a wad of money from his pocket, the officer approached 
and the other man put the money back into his pocket (R. 80, 85) 
In holding that Officer Dailey acted with reasonable 
suspicion, the trial court noted that if defendant had produced 
something in exchange for the money, Officer Dailey would have 
witnessed "what appeared to be a completed drug transaction" (R. 
81) .5 [Emphasis added.] Thereafter, the court concluded: 
It seems to me that under the 
circumstances, that the officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion to approach 
those individuals and make that stop and 
detain those individuals based on what the 
officer had observed. The only thing that 
the officer really -- that's not too many 
steps from a completed transaction, if you 
will. Some of that conduct -- obviously that 
conduct could also be interpreted as innocent 
conduct because there was not a completed 
drug transaction observed. But by the same 
token, it would give rise to a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a crime was about 
to occur, justifying a level II stop. 
5 The record does not contain written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. That portion of the suppression hearing 
containing the trial court's findings and conclusions is attached 
at Addendum B (R. 78-87). 
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(R. 86). 
Instead of applying the totality of the circumstances test 
in challenging the trial court's conclusion, defendant dissects 
each of the court's findings, attempting to show that none of the 
officer's observations, in isolation, is sufficient to justify 
his reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, defendant 
argues that the entire incident is consistent with panhandling, 
that the incident's occurring in a locality known for drug 
trafficking is insignificant, that defendant's approaching the 
other man by straddling his bicycle is plainly innocent, that the 
other man's out-of-place appearance does not bear on reasonable 
suspicion of defendant's criminal activity and that defendant's 
not reaching for the stranger's money or exchanging anything for 
it all betokens innocent behavior, insufficient to justify a 
level II stop. Appellant's Br. at 13-16.6 
6
 Defendant also argues that Officer Dailey acknowledged 
that he only had a "hunch" when the officer approached him. 
Appellant's Br. at 13. "Hunch," as developed in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, is that level of suspicion insufficient to justify 
a level II stop. See State v. Lovearen, 829 P.2d 155, 158-59 
(Utah App. 1992)(officer's decision to search car containing 
drugs based on a "hunch," unjustified where based on observation 
of a cluttered car, and the defendants' bloodshot eyes and 
nervous behavior). That defense counsel was able to elicit this 
characterization of the officer's view of the situation (R 130, 
132) is meaningless in view of the specificity of the officer's 
observations and recitation of facts at the preliminary hearing, 
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Defendant's atomistic approach flies in the face of the 
totality of circumstances test and should be rejected. See 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 3, 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1583, 1586-87 (noting 
that the defendant's purchase of airline tickets for $2100 from a 
roll of $20 bills, travel to Miami, a source city for illicit 
drugs, and the defendant's nervous appearance, while being 
factors individually consistent with innocent travel, when taken 
together with other facts amounted to reasonable suspicion of 
illegal conduct). Indeed, defendant's attempt to Mdissect the 
facts" is precisely the approach this court has rejected in other 
cases. $££. Strjgfrling, 844 P.2d at 983/ State v. Bradford. 839 
P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992) (fact, taken in isolation, that a 
defendant is outside a car, does not overcome an officer's 
reasonable fear that the defendant may reach a weapon under the 
circumstances). 
In similar fashion, defendant relies on cases subtly though 
distinctly different from this one. S&& Gipson v. state, the 
court found 537 So.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Pla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) 
(no reasonable suspicion to detain suspect discovered huddling 
which led to the officer's detaining defendant. See Sokolow. 490 
U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (equating an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion" with a "hunch"). 
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behind bar with others in high crime area and who fled from 
police where police did not observe an exchange of drugs or 
money); State v. Ellington. 495 N.W.2d 915, 919-20 (Neb. 1993) 
(detention unjustified where the defendant, leaning into a car in 
high crime area, arms extended, quickly walked away upon seeing 
policeman where the defendant was not observed to approach the 
car or exchange money or an object); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 49, 
99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979) (no reasonable suspicion where police 
stopped the defendant, then walking away from another, in high 
crime area alley). 
In each of these cases the states' claim of reasonable 
suspicion failed because the defendants' engagement with others 
in suspicious circumstances did not sufficiently suggest or 
identify the particular criminal conduct suspected by the police. 
Thus, in Gipson and Ellington, while the defendants' conduct 
suggested illegal transactions, the appellate courts noted that 
there were no gestures, i.e., an exchange of money or drugs, that 
might reasonably give rise to more than mere suspicion. Gipson, 
537 So.2d at 1082; Ellington. 495 N.W.2d at 919-20. 
The slight, but crucial, distinction in the totality of 
circumstances which gives rise to a reasonable suspicion is 
illustrated in Thornton v. State, 559 So.2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
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App. 1990). A police officer saw the defendant standing on the 
corner of an intersection known as a place where cocaine was 
sold. Id. at 439. Another man was seen looking into the 
defendant's outstretched, cupped hand, but the officer, although 
a short distance away, could not see anything in the defendant's 
hand. Id. When the defendant noticed the officer approaching, 
he quickly turned his back and moved his hands to his groin area. 
Id. Suspecting a drug deal by an armed criminal, the officer 
asked the defendant to withdraw his hands. When the defendant 
hesitated, the officer drew his gun, after which the defendant 
withdrew his hands, dropping a baggy of cocaine to the ground. 
Id. Distinguishing Gipson. the court noted the additional fact 
which justified the officer's investigatory stop, i.e., the 
concealment of the defendant's hands. Id. See also State v. 
Doleman. 1995 WL 339184 (Del. Super.) (reasonable suspicion to 
stop where the suspect twice returned and leaned into car after 
having avoided police in area known for drug trafficking). 
This case also contains, among the totality of 
circumstances, that crucial, additional fact justifying Officer 
Dailey's reasonable suspicion, i.e., the observation of the other 
man's producing a wad of bills, following a verbal exchange with 
defendant at close range. It requires no citation to authority 
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or resort to judicial notice to adequately argue that drug 
transactions are almost invariably negotiated with cash. The 
incident took place in an area known for its high incidence of 
drug trafficking. As Officer Dailey approached defendant, the 
prospective buyer stashed the wad of money, and defendant began 
to remove himself from the scene. Thus, conduct which might only 
be considered suspicious in another context, was indicative of 
specific criminal behavior, i.e., possession with intent to 
distribute controlled substances. The minimal level of certainty 
required by the reasonable suspicion standard does not require 
that the transaction be completed, but merely that the suspected 
offense "may be afoot," Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 
or that defendant is "about to commit a crime," ££an, 869 P.2d at 
986, or "is attempting to commit a public offense," section 77-7-
15, and that the officer simply use his "common-sense" in 
evaluating the circumstances. Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S. Ct. 
at 1585-86. Under the circumstances, Officer Dailey would have 
been remiss in failing to investigate as he did. See Menke, 787 
P.2d at 540-41 (noting that when a police officer observes 
conduct giving rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only a 
right but the duty, within constitutional limits, to investigate 
and take the necessary measures to enforce the law) (citations 
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omitted). 
Finally, the trial court was impressed that Officer Dailey 
"witnessed what appeared to be a completed drug transaction," in 
which case "there would be very little or no question about the 
officer's right to stop" (R 81),i.e., a transaction giving rise 
to probable cause to arrest. See Menke. 787 P.2d at 542 
(probable cause is more than bare suspicion and exists where 
facts and circumstances warrant a reasonably cautious man in the 
belief that an offense has been is being committed). Numerous 
courts have found probable cause in circumstances where criminal 
conduct was only slightly more apparent than in this case. See 
People v. Shaw. 596 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833-34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 
(experienced officer witnessed four transactions in which the 
defendant exchanged some objects for currency with nervous 
participants who fled upon officer's approach); Com, v. Albino. 
652 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. 1995) (trained officer in area of 
frequent drug arrests observes the defendant remove a purse from 
his pants and remove an object then exchanged for currency). If 
the crucial element of exchange of currency in these cases is 
sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest, then 
equivalent conduct displaying an interrupted exchange of currency 
should establish reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. See 
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Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 ("the level of 
suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than probable cause"). 
In sum, the totality of the circumstances known to law 
enforcement meets the "minimal objective justification" standard 
needed to establish reasonable suspicion. The trial court's 
finding that Officer Dailey's detaining defendant was proper 
should therefore be upheld. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY GAVE CONSENT TO SEARCH 
EVEN BEFORE THE OFFICER REQUESTED IT; 
THEREFORE, THE ATTENUATION TEST UNDER STATE 
V. THURMAN, DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE; EVEN 
APPLYING THE THURMAN TEST, THE OFFICER'S 
CONDUCT WAS NOT SO FLAGRANT THAT EVIDENCE 
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 
Even assuming this Court were to reverse the trial court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion, defendant's convictions should 
still be affirmed because the consent was valid. Defendant 
attacks the trial court's ruling upholding Officer Dailey's 
search on the ground that defendant's consent did not vitiate his 
unlawful detention founded on a lack of reasonable suspicion. 
Appellant's Br. at 17-21. The argument lacks merit upon the 
unusual circumstance that defendant not only consented, but 
volunteered the search of his person even before the officer 
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requested consent to search. Therefore, the attenuation test 
developed under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and 
refined by State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), does not 
apply to this case. Even if the Arroyo/Thurman test were applied 
to this case, suppression would be inappropriate because the test 
is primarily focussed on the deterrent function of the 
exclusionary rule in cases of police misconduct, not flagrant or 
even negligent in this case, if there was misconduct at all. 
See Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (J. Powell, 
concurring) (because the search can be sanctioned under the 
attenuation test, there is "no legitimate justification for 
depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence"). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the denial of defendants 
motion to suppress. 
A. The Validity Of Defendant's Consent Under The 
Voluntariness Prong of Thurman. 
Under Thurman, the inquiry into whether a consent to search 
is lawfully obtained following illegal police action must focus 
on two factors: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality. In this case, the record shows that defendant 
offered Officer Dailey the opportunity to search him as soon as 
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the officer had explained the reason for the detention (R. 116). 
The record does not show that the officer ever requested 
defendant's consent to search, and it is apparent that the 
officer acted upon defendant's freely given consent. The trial 
court found that defendant said, wGo ahead and search us," 
impliedly finding that the consent to search was voluntarily 
given (R. 86). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge that his consent was 
voluntary, instead focussing his argument exclusively on the 
Thurman exploitation/attenuation analysis. Appellant's Br. at 
18-21. Therefore, this Court should uphold the search of 
defendant's person because there was ample evidence to show that 
it was undertaken in response to defendant's voluntarily given 
consent. £££ State V, Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) ("Although a 
warrantless search is generally violative of the fourth amendment 
[sic], it is well settled that 'one of the specifically 
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent,1" citing SchnecklPth V. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 
93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44 (1973)); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 
913, 918-919 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's uncontroverted testimony 
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demonstrated defendant voluntarily consented to search of his 
vehicle). The first prong of Thurman. therefore, is not at 
issue. Moreover, for two reasons independent of each other, the 
second prong, i.e., the exploitation/attenuation test, of 
Thurman, should not even be applied to this case: (1) defendant 
consented to a search independent of any request by the officer, 
and (2) the trial court found that defendant's detention was 
founded on reasonable suspicion, and therefore, there exists no 
prior illegality compelling an attenuation analysis. See 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262 (w[T]he second test--the exploitation 
analysis--is triggered only if the prior illegality is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment."). This latter point has been 
fully discussed above. Appellee's Br. at Point I. 
B. Because Consent Was Not Requested 
There is No Issue of Exploitation. 
In Thurman, the court stated: 
The second determination to be made in 
deciding whether a consent following police 
illegality is valid is "whether the consent 
was obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality," Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 688; 
see also Sims Fv. Collection Div of the State 
Tax Comm'nl. 841 P.2d [6], 10 [(Utah 1992)]; 
£l+ rstate v.T Allen. 839 P.2d [291] 300 
[(Utah 1992)], or in other words, "whether 
the ftaint1 of the Fourth Amendment violation 
was sufficiently attenuated to permit 
introduction of the evidence," TNew York v.1 
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Harris, 495 U.S. [14] , 19, H O S. Ct. [1640], 
1643-44 r (1990)1 (citing TUnited States v.1 
Crews. 445 U.S. [463], 471, 100 S. Ct. [1244], 
1436 [(1980)]. The principle underlying the 
exploitation test is that the Fourth 
Amendment should not permit law enforcement 
to "ratify their own illegal conduct by 
merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred." Arroyo. 796 P.2d 
at 689. 
Thurman/ 846 P.2d at 1263. 
As discussed below, the exploitation/attenuation analysis 
used to invalidate an otherwise voluntary consent is driven by 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. The rationale 
for exclusion is founded on the idea that the consent to search 
is the result of the "chain of presumptive coercion" resulting 
from the prior illegality. United States v. McCoy. 839 F. Supp. 
1442, 1445 (D. Or. 1993) (citing flarflone v, United States, 308 
U.S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268 (1939)). However, under the 
Arroyo/Thurman test, suppression also requires a showing of 
police exploitation, initiated by the officer's request for 
consent. See Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 689 (rejecting the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals' attenuation analysis in which law 
enforcement's request for consent was not an element in 
determining exploitation). 
In this case the trial court found that defendant consented 
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to the search without Officer Dailey's even having asked him for 
consent (R. 86). Because there was never an official request for 
a consent to search, defendant cannot credibly argue that law 
enforcement exploited his alleged illegal detention. Therefore, 
the second prong of the Arroyo/Thurman test should not even be 
applied to this case, and this Court should simply find that 
defendant's consent to search was valid. However, even applying 
the exploitation test, the consent was valid.7 
C. Arroyo's Attenuation/Exploitation Prong As 
Clarified In Thurman. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the analysis to be 
conducted under the exploitation (or attenuation) prong of 
7
 The trial court found that defendant's detention was 
based on reasonable suspicion, and that the search was based on 
defendant's consent. Therefore, the court did not make specific 
findings with respect to defendant's attenuation argument; 
however, this Court may affirm the lower court's decision on any 
proper ground. State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah 
App. 1991); see also Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1273 (assessing 
elements of the attenuation test where the trial court failed to 
make findings because the record was sufficient to make such ". 
determination). In this case the record is sufficient to show 
that even if the trial court was required to have engaged in an 
attenuation analysis because there was a prior illegality, i.e., 
lack of reasonable suspicion to detain, suppression is not 
warranted because it cannot be said that Officer Dailey 
"exploited" the prior illegality in order to obtain defendant's 
consent. 
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Arrgyo. State V. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262-64. Significantly, 
the Court began its discussion of the exploitation prong with an 
unequivocal statement of the policy consideration that underlies 
Arroyo; 
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police 
from engaging in illegal conduct even though 
that conduct may be followed by a voluntary 
consent to the subsequent search. 
The deterrence rationale discussed in Arroyo is 
grounded in the United States Supreme Courts decision 
in Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There, 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by now 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, made it clear that the 
analysis used to invalidate consent on the basis of 
exploitation was grounded firmly in the deterrent 
purposes of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12. 
Justice Powell 's admonition that the exploitation 
analysis "always should be conducted with the deterrent 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
sharply in focus," id, at 612, has become a cornerstone 
of search and seizure jurisprudence. £££. 4 Search & 
Seizure § 11.4(a), at 373: see also Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A 
Comment. 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 390 (1964) 
[hereinafter Amsterdam]. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. 
Having identified the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule as the underpinning of the Arroyo exploitation prong, the 
Thurman Court reiterated the factors to be considered by courts: 
11
 tl)] 'the purpose and flagrancy of.the official misconduct, 
[2)] the 'temporal proximity1 of the illegality and the consent, 
and [3)] 'the presence of intervening circumstances.1" Id. at 
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1263 (citations omitted). The Thurman Court then discussed each 
factor in greater detail, emphasizing the deterrent purpose of 
the exclusionary rule throughout its discussion. 
Clearly, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor is the most 
significant of the three because it is "directly related to the 
deterrent value of suppression." Id. at 1263 (citations 
omitted). As such, the first task a court should complete under 
the exploitation prong is to characterize the nature and degree 
of the prior illegality based on a continuum of "flagrancy" and 
"egregiousness." Id. See also State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) (post-
Thurman case in which this Court began its attenuation analysis 
by evaluating police misconduct on scale of purposefulness and 
flagrancy). 
To put the Thurman continuum into perspective, it must first 
be recognized that "'[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which [sic] has deprived 
the defendant of some right.1" Id. (quoting Brown. 422 U.S. at 
612 (Powell, J., concurring) in turn quoting Michigan v. Tucker. 
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Further, "[t]he nature and degree of 
the illegality will usually be inversely related to the 
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effectiveness of time and intervening events to dissipate the 
presumed taint. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264, 
Thus, at one end of the continuum is police misconduct that 
is "flagrantly abusive, [such that] there is a greater likelihood 
that the police engaged in the conduct as a pretext for 
collateral objectives," or instances in which "the purpose of the 
misconduct was to achieve the consent[.]" Id. (citations 
omitted). In such cases, court "will require a clean break in 
the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent to 
find the consent valid." Id. In the absence of such a clean 
break, "suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater 
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future." Id. 
(footnote and citation omitted). 
Next in line to purposeful or flagrant misconduct on the 
Thurman continuum is negligent police misconduct. "[W]here it 
appears that the illegality arose as the result of negligence, 
the lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and the 
presence of intervening events become less critical to the 
dissipation of the taint." Id. at 1264. 
At the other extreme of purposeful and flagrant misconduct 
are instances where "the police had no 'purpose1 in engaging in 
the misconduct--for example, if the illegality arose because [a 
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court] later invalidated a statute on which the police had relied 
in good faith--suppression would have no deterrent value." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
D. Officer Dailey's Conduct Was Not 
Negligent Under the Circumstances. 
In Thurman. the police sought a warrant authorizing no-knock 
authority. In spite of the magistrate's clear refusal to issue 
such a warrant, police battered down the defendant's door thirty 
seconds after having announced their presence, rousted him from 
his bed naked, and kept him in shackled for six hours before he 
gave the crucial consent to search. Id. at 1273. 
Notwithstanding this very purposeful conduct, "calculated to 
cause at least surprise, if not confusion and fright," the court 
found that suppression was not required because there was a clean 
break between the misconduct and the consent. Id. at 1273-74. 
Patently, the misconduct in this case, if there be any, does 
not nearly approach that in Thurman. Rather, it more closely 
resembles that in State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), 
wherein the court found that suppression was not required where 
police entered the premises without announcing their presence, 
mistakenly thinking they were executing a no-knock warrant. 
In this case Officer Dailey rounded a corner on his 
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motorcycle and witnessed at close range an exchange that, given 
the circumstances and his observations, would have roused the 
suspicions of any experienced law enforcement agent, even if 
insufficient to satisfy a legal determination of reasonable 
suspicion. However, the situation required a split-second 
assessment. Sag. United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S 675, 105 S. Ct. 
1568 (1985) (the court "should take care to consider whether 
police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such 
cases the court should not engage in unrealistic second-
guessing" ). Considering the officer's duty to observe and 
investigate such suspicious encounters, see Menke, 787 P.2d at 
540, Officer Dailey's decision to intercede and detain defendant 
should not be considered negligent. Since the officer's conduct 
was not negligent, the fact that the consent followed the alleged 
misconduct almost immediately, without any intervening event, 
should not weigh heavily in the attenuation analysis. 
In sum, even assuming a prior illegality in detaining 
defendant without reasonable suspicion, this Court should find 
that the police did not exploit that illegality to obtain 
defendant's consent to search. Rather, it should recognize that 
defendant volunteered to be searched and that his consent was 
therefore not the product of police misconduct. The Court: should 
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further recognize that, given the reasonability of Officer 
Dailey's conduct, the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule 
would not be served by suppression of evidence in this case. 
REQUEST FOR QKhh ARGUMENT ANP WRITTEN OPINION 
Given the fact sensitivity of search and seizure cases, the 
State believes that this Court's decision-making process aided by 
oral argument in this case and therefore requests oral argument. 
Further, because the scope of reasonable suspicion and the 
application of the exploitation/attenuation analysis is so fact 
sensitive, this case warrants a written published opinion to 
further clarify Utah law in these areas. 
CONCISION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that the trial courtfs denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress and judgment of conviction be affirmed. 
-A 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /> day of October, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH A. BRO'NSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Q. Please state your name and spell your last name for the 
record. 
A. It's Kenneth Dailey, D-A-I-L-E-Y. 
Q. What's your occupation? 
A. A police officer with Salt Lake City Police. 
Q. Are you a certified category one police officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department? 
A. I've been with them four years with eight years in law 
enforcement. 
Q. A total of eight years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who before S a l t Lake City Pol ice? 
A. The Univers i ty of Utah. COURT OF APPEALS 
Wol<x>-cA 
Q. Does that training include the detection and apprehension of 
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persons involved in drug issues? 
A. Yes. I also worked a year of undercover narcotics. So, yes, 
I've had a lot of training. 
Q. Can you tell me about your training and experience involving 
drugs? 
A. I've had several classes through POST, and also been to 
different seminars and stuff the year I worked narcotics in Las 
Vegas. I wouldn't know the total hours. 
Q. Let's take your attention to July 27, 1994, at 150 South 500 
West, approximately 6:53 p.m. Were you on duty at that time at 
that location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To your knowledge, is that location in Salt Lake County? 
A. It is. 
Q. What were you doing at that time at that location? 
A. I was in an area that is well known for drug trafficking. I 
work on the motorcycle squad and we were asked to go and check out 
the Pioneer Park area. 
Q. Were you in uniform at that time? 
A. I was. 
Q. Were you on your motorcycles? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that a marked motorcycle? 
A. Yes. 
Q* What did you observe at that time at that location? 
A. I observed two males approach each other. One had pulled some 
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money out of his pocket. 
Q, Did you actually see money? 
A. Yes. It was in a wad in his hand. 
Q. How far were you from that individual when you saw that? 
A. Well, I got as close as maybe 25 feet before he actually put 
it back in. 
Q. Then what. 
A. They started to separate and I asked them....I got off and 
detained them both and asked them to wait for another officer to 
come. 
Q. Were you riding alone? 
A. I was. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. Another officer pulled up shortly and was talking to both of 
them. I explained to them what I observed and what I felt could be 
going on. 
Q. What did you tell them. 
A. I told them that we were having a terrible problem with drug 
activity in the area and that I felt there was a drug transaction 
going on and that we were waiting for another officer to arrive. 
Q. What did they say when you told them that? 
A. There response was that both of them said that I could search 
them. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. At that point, the officer was getting out of his car and so 
I waited for him and we searched. 
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Q. What officer? 
A. Officer Wolrich. 
<?• And, huh, you're saying that they said that you could search 
them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask to search them? 
A. No. Um, they just blurted out the statement from both of 
them. 
Q. And so you did search them? 
A. Yea, meantime for the one came b^ck with some warrants too. 
Q* Which individual, do you recall? 
A. The defendant, uh the gentleman sitting at the defense table. 
Q» The two individuals that you observed, would you recognize 
them if they were in court today? One or both? 
A. Huh, one for sure. 
Q. Is that person in court today? 
A- Yes. 
Q. Would you point him out and describe what he is wearing? 
A. The gentleman at the defense tale in the gray jumpsuit. 
Q. Vour honor, may the record reflect the identification. 
Judge M: Yes. 
Q. You searched the individuals. Did you find anything? 
A. Ves, there's urn, in the defendant's shoe there was a bag of 
marijuana. 
Q. Xn what shoe? Do you recall? 
A, X don't recall exactly what shoe without reading the report 
00117 
but it was in, actually under the liner of the shoe that he was 
wearing. At that point, he was under arrest for both the warrant 
and that. Um, Officer Wolrich turned the bike over to check to see 
if that was stolen. 
Q. How far were you from Officer Wolrich when this was going on? 
A. Just a couple feet. 
Q. Where was the other person with the money at this time? 
A. He had been released on just like a field card information 
cause there was nothing that we felt we did have anything on him. 
Q. O.K., Can you describe that individual? 
A. He was white male, mid-thirties. He was dressed different 
from the usual person we're seeing in that area. 
Q. Describe him. 
A. He was dressed in um like new clothes, huh, shorts looked like 
he was going to play tennis. He had like a golf shirt, new shoes, 
tennis shoes, um.. 
Q. That person was released. What did you do with the defendant? 
A. He was placed under arrest for the warrant and also for having 
marijuana. 
Q. Tell me about the bicycle. 
A. The bicycle that I had actually seen him on and riding, there 
was a white plastic sack, like your Smiths' garbage or grocery 
sack, um, on bicycle tied to the handle bars. And when the officer 
turned it over, some white powder and item came out of the bag that 
was on the bag. 
Q. What did you do with that? 
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A: Well they, the one, the powder that was on the ground, just 
cleaned up that and then there was a container, like I said it was 
a paper that we grabbed that still had some of the light powder in 
it. And we field tested that. 
Q: What did you field test it with? 
A: A cocaine test kit. 
Q: Eow do you know huh, that the field test kit was ok? 
A: It was indicted. All the vials was intact, everything was 
indicted and hadn't been used. 
Q: Can these kits be used twice? 
A: No. 
Q: Ok and what was the results of that test? 
A: It was positive for huh, cocaine. 
Q: Alright. And what did you do after that? 
A: We had, Officer Wolrich and I huh, I took the evidence and 
placed it in police evidence and we transported the individual to 
jail. 
Q: Did you have conversation with the defendant huh, regarding 
what it was that you found in the plastic sack? 
A: Yes, huh, well there was also soae spontaneous comments that 
were made too. 
Q: Can you tell me about those? 
A: The individual, he said that the marijuana was his, and he 
smokes marijuana something to the effect huh, cause that's a 
misdemeanor and the cocaine is a felony. So that wasn't his. He 
claimed that the cocaine didn't come out of the bag. You know. 
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Q: Where did he claim it came from? 
A: From Officer Wolrich. 
Q: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMTVATTOW 
MM: You have been vith the Salt Lake City Police Department for 4 
years. Is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And on this particular day you were on motorcycle patrol? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you part of any huh, detail assigned to Pioneer Park area? 
A: Yes, that day I believe huh, about once a week we're assigned 
to go down there. 
Q: And who assigns you there. 
A: Just our Sargent, its kind of an informal type assignment. 
Q: And you were assigned there on that particular day? 
A: Urn huh, for that .. 
Q: By your Sargent? 
A: Yes. 
Q: With what orders? 
A: Its just a verbal informal, instead of going out and responding 
to calls, they want us to go down and do that. Not respond to 
calls. 
Q: Go down and do what? 
A: Check just the area for the problems that have been going on. 
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From everything from traffic problems to drug problems to DUX 
problems but the difference is that we just don't respond to calls. 
Q: So you go down there and just investigate if there's any .. 
A: Just anything that happens. 
Q: Is that part of the zero tolerance policy that the police 
department have enforce at this time? 
A: I've never heard it stated that way, other than just by other 
officers. 
Q: What have your heard? 
A: What's that? 
Q: The other officers refer to it as that? 
A: Like our Captain has said that you know, we don't want kind of 
a zero tolerance. Not exactly those words but they want to take 
care or clean up the area. 
Q: And your detail on that particular day was part of this clean 
up effort? Is that whats your testimony? 
A: In an informal way. 
Q: You say that this area is known for drug trafficking? This is 
an area down around the Shelter, is it not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You have been given intelligence reports about the activity in 
the area, I take it? 
A: Several times, yeah. 
Q: Now, you were on your motorcycle, and that's a marked unit? 
A: Yes. 




Q: This takes place at about 6:00 at night? 
A: I wouldn't know the exact time but yeah it was probably around 
there. 
Q: It was still light out? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You were traveling which direction on your motorcycle? 
A: Urn, I would have been coming from 2nd South, so Northbound. 
Q: Northbound on which street? 
A: 500 West. 
Q: You see two men on the sidewalk. Where are they, which side of 
the sidewalk? 
A: Um, there's only one in that area and that's on the West side. 
Q: The West side of 5th West? 
A: Of 5th West yes. 
Q: How far away from them were you when you first noticed them? 
A:. I noticed them when I turned the corner .. 
Q: Eow far away is that? 
A: You know its maybe half a block. 
Q: They were facing which direction? First of all, Mr. Rodriguez? 
Which direction is he facing? 
A: Right now? 
Q: When you first saw him. 
A: They were facing away from me. They were facing each other. 
They weren't looking my direction at that point. 




Q: Bis back was to you? 
A: fie just wasn't looking my direction. It could have be^n the 
side or what. 
Q: The other gentleman was .. 
A: They were facing each other. 
Q: Yes, and what I'm trying to get from you is that Mr. Rodriguez 
vas facing which way? The other gentleman was facing which way? 
I can understand them facing one another, which? 
A: I know. I believe that Mr. Rodriguez was facing in an 
Northeast direction, the other gentleman would have been a 
Southwest. That's what I can recall. 
Q: What businesses are in that area? 
A: I couldn't tell you. There's a bar, there's a car lot type 
place and I think the one is a moving storage type place. 
Q: The two gentleman are, seem to be talking to one another? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you say you saw the one gentleman pull something out of his 
pocket, isn't that correct? 
A: Urn huh. 
Q: And you were how far away when you saw that? 
A: Well as I got close to them I eould see that and like I say, 
when I finally realized that I felt it vas money, huh.. 
Q: You felt it was money? 
A: I could see that it was green. It was like a wad and it looked 
like money, yes. 
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Q: You have no idea of the relationship between the two men on the 
side of the sidewalk when you first saw them? 
A: When I first saw them, no. 
Q: And the gentleman that seemed out of place to you huh, had his 
hands in his pockets? 
A: Mo, like I said he had his hand out of his pocket. 
Q: Did you ever see his hand in his pocket? 
A: Yeah, and he pulled the green wad out of his pocket. 
Q: They noticed you and walked away? Is that correct? 
A: They attempted, like I said, I was fairly close at that point 
and I asked them to stop which they did. 
Q: Ok, let me ask you another thing, you asked them to stop, they 
would include Mr. Rodriguez and the other gentleman? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Mr. Rodriguez had nothing at that point which was in violation 
of the law, is that correct? 
A: No. 
Q: That's a no? 
A: No. 
Q: You didn't see Mr. Rodriguez break the law at that point did 
you? 
A: Not at that point, no. 
Q: And all you saw this other individual do was pull something 
that you thought was money out of his pocket? 
A: That's correct. 





Q: He simply sat there on his bicycle. 
A: No. Well huh, there were approaching each other like they were 
getting closer. 
Q: So Mr. Rodriguez is riding down the street on this bicycle and 
the other man is walking? 
A: He was straddling his bicycle with his feet on the ground. 
Q: Moving the bicycle along the sidewalk? 
A: Towards the .. 
Q: And the other gentleman is walking down the sidewalk as well 
towards Mr. Rodriguez. 
A: No, they weren't that far apart at all. Urn, they were just 
approaching each other and like I say, he was straddling his 
bicycle and maybe just walked a few steps towards the gentleman. 
Q: At that time Mr. Rodriguez was not free to leave is that 
correct? 
A: No. 
Q: You told it while (inaudible). They started to separate, 
correct? 
A: Yeah. 
They attempted to move away from you, isn't that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You told them to stop? 
A: Z asked them to, yes. 




A: Z explained why. 
Q: My question is that they were not free to leave at that point? 
Isn't that right? 
A: No. 
Q: It's not right? 
A: I just answered that were not free to leave, no. 
Q: Ok. Ok. And you at that point in time indicated to them that 
you were having problems in the area with drugs and that you felt 
that there vas a drug transaction going on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And prior to that point in time, you had not mirandized either 
individual, is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Mr. Rodriguez certainly vas not mirandized? 
A: No. 
Q: So you made these statements to them about what you were doing 
and they responded? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The other person seemed out of place, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you let him go, is that correct? 
A: Yes. After the investigation. 
Q: You let him go because you had nothing to hold him on, isn't 
that right? 
A: After ve did like huh, record checks and stuff like that. 
Q: Eov long did that take? 
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A: Just a few minutes. 
Q: Ee never indicated that he was there to buy cocaine? 
A: Ee did. 
Q: Where is that in your report? 
A: Urn, x just remember informally talking to him and Z asked him. 
I don't know if that is in my report, Z just .. 
Q: It's an important fact isn't it? 
A: What's that? 
Q: That is an important fact isn't it? 
A: Sure. Z don't know if it is but Z can recall it right now the 
gentleman's .. Ee told me that he was there to do that but that 
hadn't even taken place. Ee was there to purchase drugs but that 
didn't take place. 
Q: Yet you let him go? 
A: Cause we did have anything on him. Ee had no warrants. All we 
had on him was .. 
Q: You had probable cause to believe that he was attempting to 
purchase drugs, isn't that correct? 
A: No because they were still a couple feet away. Z didn't feel, 
Z didn't have any drugs on him, all Z had on him was money. 
"Q: So you didn't feel he was in any way in violation of the law 
himself? 
A: No. Other than suspicious. 





Q: Be never gave you permission to search his bicycle. 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Nov, you indicated in your report that the substance that fell 
out of the white bag had spilled out, isn't that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Isn't it true that the substance vas on the sidewalk prior to 
the time that you confronted Mr. Rodriguez? 
A: No. That's not true. 
Q: Never found any substance spilled out in the plastic bag that 
vas on Mr. Rodriguez's bicycle, did you? 
A: What's that? 
Q: Substance, there vas no cocaine spilled out inside the vhite 
plastic bag on the handle bars vas there? 
A: Da, I'm not sure I understand hov your saying that. There vas 
an item that came out of that with the substance. Coming out of 
it. 
Q: And the substance vas coming out of this item? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But none of the substance vas inside, the item didn't spill 
inside the plastic bag did it? 
A: No. 
Q: It didn't recover any cocaine from the plastic bag itself. 
A: No. 
Q: You at no point in time mirandized Mr. Rodriguez, did you? 
A: I didn't question him. 




Q: This individual, did you take note of his name? 
A: A field card by the other officer. 
Q: Do you know what his name was? 
A: I couldn't tell you. 
Q: you say he was a white male? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In his mid-thirties? 
A: Approximately. 
Q: Bad shorts on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And a golf shirt? 
A: Yes. 
Q: By his own admission, he was attempting to purchase cocaine? 
A: Z recall him saying drugs. 
Q: Describe the item that fell out of the plastic bag? 
A:- It looked to me like a crumbled up paper ball. 
Q: Alright, at the time that you saw the two men, at the time that 
you saw them on the sidewalk together, you didn't hear any 
conversation between them? 
A: No. 
Q: I just want to make sure that I understand what Mr. Rodriguez 
was doing. The other man was pulling something from his pocket, 
Kr. Rodriguez was on his bicycle? 
A: And they were close to each other. 
Q: Close to each other. And Mr. Rodriguez at no time made any 
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of his pocket? 
A: No. 
Q: At the time that you saw the tvo Ben, you had no idea vhat they 
vere doing? 
A: Um, veil huh, I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q: You had a hunch that something vas going on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That's all your honor. 
RE DIRECT 
VM: Just a couple of questions your honor. 
Judge M: Go ahead. 
Q: Officer, did you search the defendant before the bike vas 
searched? 
A:- Yes. 
Q: Was the marijuana found before the bike vas searched? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Ok. And when you approached these tvo individuals, could you 
tell if they vere communicating with each other? 
A: Zt looked like they vere. Like Z said, they vere really close 
to each other. 
Q: How vere they communicating with each other? 
A: Looked like talking. 
Q: Did you notice any eye contact? 
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A: Yes. They were looking at each other. 
Q: Any physical gestures besides talking? 
A: Other than moving you know, towards each other, no that I 
recall. 
Q: But you didn't hear what it was that they were saying? 
A: Ho. 
Q: Ok. No further questions your honor. 
*E CROSS 
MM: The individual that indicated he was there to purchase drugs, 
didn't say which drugs he was there to purchase, is that correct? 
A: Z don't recall that, no. 
Q: The substance that was tested to be cocaine was found in a 
piece of paper rolled up? 
A:- Like a ball, yes. 
Q: Like a ball? Was it in a type of plastic twist? 
A: No, it was in that balled paper. There was leaf, what it was, 
there was the paper and then a leaf on that and then the white 
substance and then that was rolled up. And it partially opened when 
it fell out. 
Q: So it easily spilled out then? 
A: Urn huh. 




A. I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it 
after the test. But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a 
maple leaf*type thing. 
Q. When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that 
he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't do that immediately, did you? 
A. Zt was relatively short after that because I explained to him 
that I was going to wait for my safety. I was waiting for the 
other officer to arrive. 
Q. During that period of time he wasn't free to leave. 
A. No. It was a real short period of time and there was ajflot of 
officers in that area. The officer pulled up just momentarily. 
Q. So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch 
that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and 
you tell them why you are there, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you wait for backup. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that 
was going on, isn't that correct? 
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A. I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it 
after the test. But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a 
maple leaf-type thing. 
Q. When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that 
he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't do that immediately, did you? 
A. It was relatively short after that because I explained to him 
that I was going to wait for my safety. I was waiting for the 
other officer to arrive. 
Q. During that period of time he wasn't free to leave. 
A. No. It was a real short period of time and there was allot of 
officers in that area. The officer pulled up just momentarily. 
Q. So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch 
that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and 
you tell them why you are there, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you wait for backup. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that 
was going on, isn't that correct? 
A. I said, I explained why I was there and the officer arrived 
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like simultaneously. It was a real short period. 
Q. Mr. Rodriguez indicated to you, at that point in time, that he 
wasn't doing anything improper, isn't that correct? 
A. The only thing he said to me was that Z could go ahead and 
search him. 
Q. Meaning to you that he didn't feel that there was anything to 
hide, isn't that correct? 
A. Urn, that's probably what he thought. Z wouldn't entertain 
what he was thinking, Z don't know. 
Q. That's how you interpret it, though, isn't that correct? 
A. Z didn't interpret it, but that's just what he said. 
Moffat: Nothing further, your Honor. 
Judge: You may step down. 
Pros: That's the States only witness, your honor, for the 
purposes of this hearing there is a stipulation as far as the tox 
report; and if Z may read that. "Cocaine was identified in the 
plastic bag. The total weight of the sample was 1.8 grams. The 
plastic bag was found to contain 4.0 grams of crushed marijuana. 
Kevin L. Smith, Criminalist." 
Judge: Mr. Moffat? 
Moffat: Your honor, we will be calling no witnesses. Richard, 
you have the right to testify today but my advice to you is that 
you not testify. Will you follow my advice? 
Richard: Z will follow your advice. 
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1 MR. MOFFAT: Your Honor, I think the officer's 
2 testimony that he detained the individuals speaks for itself. 
3 That takes it right out of Dietman's Level I encounter. 
4 MR. MEISTER: Your Honor, if we look at — defense 
5 counsel is using "detention" and "seizure" interchangeably. 
6 And the case law is clear that you can have detention without 
7 seizure. All detentions do not equate with seizure. Terrv 
8 is the first case on that. 
9 MR. MOFFAT: When detention occurs, your Honor, 
10 there is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
11 Amendment. 
12 MR. MEISTER: Not true. 
13 THE COURT: Just a minute. 
14 MR. MOFFAT: I think that's what Terrv says. 
15 Your Honor, if I may direct the Court's attention 
16 to page 361 of the opinion of Brown v. Texas. under the 
17 Roman numeral II it says, 
18 "When an officer retained appellant for the 
19 purpose of requiring him in this case to identify 
20 himself, they performed a seizure of his person 
21 subject to the requirements of the Fourth 
22 Amendment." 
23 THE COURT: I am actually persuaded by 
24 Mr. Rodriguez's arguments as to what level of stop this was. 
25 The testimony that's before the Court and any evidence that's 
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2 a drug transaction in process or about to go on or had just 
3 concluded. And, in fact, what he told these two individuals 
4 when he approached them was that they were having a terrible 
5 problem with drug activity in the area and that he felt there 
6 was a drug transaction going on and that, quote, "We were 
7 waiting for another officer to arrive." 
8 That98 his conversation with — 
9 MR. MOFFAT: I believe that's his conversation with 
10 the officer. 
11 MR. MEISTER: No, the conversation with the 
12 defendant and the other individual that was in attendance. 
13 MR. MOFFAT: What page are you on? 
14 THE COURT: On page 3. 
15 "Q Were you riding alone? 
16 "A I was. 
17 NQ What happened then? 
18 "A Another officer pulled up shortly and was 
19 talking to both of them. I explained to them 
20 what I observed and what I felt was going on. 
21 "Q What did you tell them? 
22 "A I told them we were having a terrible 
23 problem with drug activity in the area and that I 
24 felt there was a drug transaction going on, and 
25 that we were waiting for another officer to 
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1 arrive. 
2 "Q What did they say when you told them that? 
3 "A Their response was that both of them said 
4 that I could search them." 
5 So the way I first read it, and as I read it 
6 again, it does look as though he actually informed the 
7 defendant and this other individual that when he approached 
8 them that he felt there was a drug transaction going on. And 
9 in light of also the dialogue that he was going to call for 
10 backup, it seems to the Court that the weight of the evidence 
11 is that this was not a Level I search ~ or a stop, rather. 
12 That this was a Level II stop. 
13 Now, the question was, is there a reasonable 
14 articulable suspicion as to whether these individuals were 
15 about to commit a crime or were in the process of committing 
16 a crime? And the evidence as to that is, first of all, this 
17 is an experienced officer with a year in narcotics 
18 enforcement. He saw these two individuals. While this was 
19 in a high drug trafficking area, he saw Mr. Rodriguez on a 
20 bicycle, sort of not peddling but moving his bicycle along 
21 with his feet toward the other individual. And the other 
22 individual is dressed in what appeared to the officer to be 
23 something like a tennis outfit, shorts and a Polo kind of 
24 shirt. And that he saw this individual take out of his 
25 pocket a wad of money, what appeared to him to be money. 
0C080 
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2 Mr. Rodriguez produce something from him in exchange for this 
3 money, I think it could be fairly said the witness witnessed 
4 what appeared to be a completed drug transaction and there 
5 would be very little or no question about the officer's right 
6 to stop. On the other hand, it would be just as clear on the 
7 other side of the scale if the officer saw these two 
8 individuals on the street have a brief encounter, no wad of 
9 money and move on, even though it's in a high trafficking 
10 area, that would be wholly consistent with lawful activity. 
11 What this case turns on is whether looking at the 
12 totality of the circumstances the officer had a reasonable 
13 articulable suspicion. 
14 Mr. Moffat, I need to ask you, is it your position 
15 that the officer himself has to bring all these elements 
16 together, or can the officer testify to what he observed and 
17 then have that presented in the form of argument to the 
18 Court? You seem to be suggesting that the officer has to do 
19 some kind of running commentary on, Well, in my training 
20 this, and, In my training that. Is that what you feel is 
21 necessary? 
22 MR. MOFFAT: I would, your Honor, especially in a 
23 situation such as this where we have behavior that is wholly 
24 consistent with innocent conduct taking place in front of the 
25 officer's eyes. And I needn't remind the Court this is in an 
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1 area very close to the shelter• These gentlemen could nave 
2 been doing anything. Again, the officer testified that he 
3 did not know the relationship between the two men,, He didn't 
4 know if they knew one another. This could have been 
5 Mr. Rodriguez, a homeless person, at the shelter panhandling 
6 money from another person in the shelter. There is nothing 
7 wrong with that, your Honor. 
8 It could have been a situation where this person 
9 owes Mr. Rodriguez money. It could have been a situation 
10 where Mr. Rodriguez sees money and pulls his money out of his 
11 pocket to assure he is in possession and puts it back in. 
12 Because that's what occurs: He has it out, he hue it in his 
13 hands, and then he puts it back in his pocket. 
14 I think there has to be an articulated basis on 
15 the record as to how all of these elements intertwine into 
16 the officer's decision to detain. And that's my argument. 
17 This behavior in my estimation, your Honor, is completely 
18 consistent with innocent conduct, and there is nothing more 
19 than innocent conduct going on here. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Meister, do you wish to add 
21 anything to this? 
22 MR. MEISTER: Well, your Honor, I disagree that 
23 it98 completely consistent with innocent conduct or 
24 noncriminal conduct. In this case what we have to look at is 
25 what the officer, in his training and experience, how he sees 
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1 this. And the case law — again if we look at State v. 
2 ftaminski, it says, if the officer sees this, he has a duty, 
3 a sworn duty, to investigate this. If he investigates and 
4 finds what Mr. Moffat says, that this is innocent behavior, 
5 then they go on. But he has a duty to investigate this. 
6 But in the officer's opinion, this is not 
7 consistent with legal behavior in this particular area. If 
8 it was consistent, then he has no reason to stop them and 
9 probably wouldn't have stopped them. In this case he has 
10 articulated, and he did articulate in the preliminary 
11 hearing — and maybe we can all articulate things better than 
12 we do — but he articulated enough, and the case law is 
13 clear, that he had a reasonable suspicion. And the probable 
14 cause does not have to be correct. They can be wrong in 
15 their reasonable suspicions. They can be wrong in their 
16 probable cause, but that doesn't mean that things get 
17 suppressd if they are wrong and have an unreasonable 
18 suspicion. 
19 The officer articulated what he thought. And not 
20 only did he articulate to the Court in a preliminary hearing 
21 but he articulated it to the defendant. He articulated it to 
22 the other officer that was there, and he articulated it to 
23 the other individual in the tennis suit, as far as what he 
24 thought was going on and what he was going to do about it and 
25 what they were going to do about it. And their comment was, 
00083 
1 I consent, go ahead and search us. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Moffat? 
3 You get the last word. 
4 MR. MOFFAT: Simply this: There is nothing about 
5 the behavior that these individuals were engaged in that 
6 factored into any of the officer's training. Again, it's not 
7 articulated on the record. He doesn't say anything on the 
8 record at the hearing that says, Look, I was trained in this 
9 and this and this. And we were trained to look at what drug 
10 transactions were, and when a drug transaction takes place, X 
11 Y and Z goes down, and you look for people out of character 
12 in the area, or you look for Mexicans or something like that. 
13 There is nothing like that articulated on the 
14 record, your Honor. All we have in this case, your Honor, is 
15 the officer saying he had a hunch. It isn't articulated 
16 beyond a hunch. 
17 MR. MEISTER: I don't see the hunch. 
18 MR. MOFFAT: It's page 17. I believe it's your 
19 last question on recross, isn't it? 
20 Let me find it. 
21 THE COURT: Or your last question on cross, I 
22 believe. I remember seeing it. 
23 MR. MOFFAT: Yes. There were two areas where I 
24 spoke to him about what he was -- page 17 is one. 
25 MR. MEISTER: Well then, your Honor, in all 
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1 fairness as far as that type of question, I can say, Did you 
2 have a reasonable suspicion of something going on, and 
3 defense counsel using that language that comes out in certain 
4 cases, his answer would have probably been yes, too. 
5 MR. MOFFAT: And you may have the second page, your 
6 Honor. 
7 MR. MEISTER: I think if we are going to get 
8 technical, your Honor, on the transcript itself from the 
9 hearing, maybe we do need a rehearing as far as an 
10 evidentiary hearing, or are we going to take this in the 
11 spirit of the preliminary hearing? 
12 MR. MOFFAT: I think you have pages 19 and 20. I 
13 believe there is a second reference to a hunch. 
14 Aside from that, your Honor ~ I think I made my 
15 point fairly clear on that. 
16 THE COURT: Yes. Page 17, that's the only place I 
17 recall seeing it. That was a question in cross examination. 
18 Well, again, what the officer had was a high drug 
19 traffic area, an individual on a bicycle moving along, not 
20 peddling but by his feet, approach — two individuals 
21 approaching one another, speaking briefly. The individual 
22 not on the bicycle has a wad of money in his pocket, takes it 
23 out. The officer approaches. The money goes back into the 
24 pocket at some point in this sequence and the individuals 
25 separate. The officer approaches and asks them to stop. And 
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1 that is what the officer had. 
2 It seems to me that under the circumstances, that 
3 the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
4 approach those individuals and make that stop and detain 
5 those individuals based on what the officer had observed. 
6 The only thing that the officer really ~ that's not too many 
7 steps from a completed transaction, if you will. Some of 
8 that conduct -- obviously that conduct could also be 
9 interpreted as innocent conduct because there was not a 
10 completed drug transaction observed. But by the same token, 
11 it would give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
12 a crime was about to occur, justifying a Level II stop. 
13 Based on the testimony, the Court finds that the 
14 stop therefore was not illegal. 
15 With regard to the search then, the testimony 
16 before the Court is that the individuals weren't even asked 
17 if they could be searched but rather they said, Go ahead and 
18 search us. Then the officer waited for backup to come and 
19 backup came very shortly. The officer emphasized that 
20 several times during his testimony, and there didn't seem to 
21 be any evidence before the Court that the detention was a 
22 lengthy detention. 
23 Frankly, the tougher question in this particular 
24 matter was the stop, not the search* The Court, doesn't find 
25 anything illegal about the search that was conducted. 
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j. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress is respectfully denied 
2 for those reasons. 
$ And Mr. Meister, I want to you prepare Findings of 
4 Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the Court's 
5 ruling here today. 
6 Is there anything else, counsel? 
7 MR. MOFFAT: There is one issue I suppose we should 
$ talk about now, your Honor. We have a trial date set in this 
9 case for October the 18th. And in speaking with Mr. Meister, 
10 it does not appear that we'll be able to proceed with trial 
11 on that date. One of the officers who is a chain officer in 
12 this case and who turned the bicycle Mr. Rodriguez was riding 
13 upside down is in Haiti and will be unavailable for quite a 
14 few months. 
15 MR. MEISTER: Until April of '95, without any 
16 indication of how long "we" are in Haiti. I got a message 
17 from him and it said that, On mandatory, mandatory military 
16 leave of absence until April of '95. 
19 MR. MOFFAT: And I suppose, your Honor, given that 
20 I would ask for this Court to release Mr. Rodriguez. He 
21 certainly can't be incarcerated for that length of time 
22 awaiting trial on a case for a delay that is not attributable 
23 to him. 
24 If the Court would allow him to be released, your 
25 Honor, I'm sure that there could be appropriate terms and 
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